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Abstract
We investigate whether management’s cognitions, values and perceptions are
associated with fraud for 18 863 ﬁrm-years for Chinese listed ﬁrms from 2000
to 2014. Demographic characteristics of the chief ﬁnancial oﬃcer (CFO) are
used as proxies for management’s cognitions, values and perceptions. We ﬁnd
that fraudulent ﬁnancial reporting is higher when CFOs are younger, male, and
have lower education backgrounds. An analysis of inﬂated earnings, ﬁctitious
assets, material omissions and other material misstatements provide similar
results, with the exception that CFOs with higher education levels are
associated with more inﬂated earnings.
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1. Introduction
Individuals charged with the governance of a ﬁrm have the primary
responsibility for fraud prevention and detection. We apply upper echelons
theory and propose that fraudulent ﬁnancial reporting of a ﬁrm reﬂects the
values, perceptions and cognitive biases of its chief ﬁnancial oﬃcer (CFO).
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Further, a CFO’s values, perceptions and cognitive biases are a function of
their observable characteristics of age, gender and education background, and
as a result, fraudulent ﬁnancial reporting decisions are associated with these
CFO observable characteristics.1
We contribute to the literature in several ways. First, we estimate manage-
ment’s cognitions, values and perceptions using the demographic characteris-
tics of age, gender and education and test whether these are related to
fraudulent ﬁnancial reporting. Management’s cognitions, values and percep-
tions can predict organisational outcomes such as strategic choices including
fraudulent ﬁnancial reporting (Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Carpenter et al.,
2004). Demographic characteristics of top executives play a signiﬁcant role in
shaping organisational outcomes (Hambrick and Mason, 1984).
Second, we examine the CFO as a representative of senior management.
Studies that apply upper echelons theory to examine unethical ﬁnancial
reporting behaviour focus on the impact of chief executive oﬃcers (CEOs)
(Huang et al., 2012; Zona et al., 2013; Abdel-khalik, 2014; Ho et al., 2015;
Palvia et al., 2015). However, it is arguable that CFOs have more inﬂuence and
power in corporate earnings management than CEOs. Jiang et al. (2010) ﬁnd
that the magnitude of abnormal accruals (a proxy for ﬁnancial reporting
quality) and the likelihood of beating analyst forecasts are more sensitive to
CFO equity incentives than to those of CEOs.2 This is supported by survey
evidence suggesting that more than 80 percent of CFOs engage in real
manipulation of activities to meet or beat earnings benchmarks, even though
this manipulation is detrimental to a ﬁrm’s future performance (Graham et al.,
2005). However, we also test the demographic characteristics of CEOs to ensure
that any characteristics of CFOs and fraudulent ﬁnancial reporting are not
driven by CEO characteristics.
Third, we distinguish between the categories of inﬂated earnings, ﬁctitious
assets, material omissions and other material misstatements relating to
fraudulent ﬁnancial reporting. Previous Australian studies have tended to
identify one category of fraudulent ﬁnancial reporting or cover general
ﬁnancial reporting due to a lack of data. To illustrate, some researchers have
focused on misappropriation of assets (Coram et al., 2008; Chapple et al.,
2009; Tan et al., 2015), while another examines nonspeciﬁc fraudulent ﬁnancial
reporting (Sharma, 2004).
Finally, we exploit a unique large data set that allows us to distinguish
fraudulent ﬁnancial reporting and personal characteristics of the CFO.
1 The main disadvantage of this approach is that demographic characteristics are
arguably limited or incomplete proxies of the CFOs’ values, perceptions and cognitive
biases (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003).
2 However, Feng et al. (2011) ﬁnd that CFOs are involved in material accounting
manipulations because they succumb to pressure from CEOs rather than seeking
immediate personal ﬁnancial beneﬁts from their own equity incentives.
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Australian studies have relied on relatively small sample sizes in comparison
with our current study using self-reporting data in the KPMG Fraud Survey
(Coram et al., 2008; Tan et al., 2015; Capezio and Mavisakalyan, 2016) and
data on companies that are subject to regulatory investigation, class actions
and media releases (Sharma, 2004; Chapple et al., 2014; Yuan and Zhang,
2016).
This unique data set arises because the Chinese government plays a forceful
role in regulating its capital markets (Firth et al., 2005; He et al., 2016a). The
China Securities Regulatory Commission, the Shanghai Stock Exchange and
the Shenzhen Stock Exchange have the authority to investigate listed ﬁrms to
determine whether ﬁnancial statements are fairly reported. Government
agencies issue public sanction reports to ﬁrms that are found to have
fraudulent reports. Sanctioned listed ﬁrms are reprimanded for inﬂated
earnings, ﬁctitious assets, material omissions and other material misstatements
that are violations of Chinese accounting standards and/or exchange listing
rules. The sanction report provides varying degrees of detail on the nature of
the misconduct, the individuals and entities involved, and the eﬀect on the
ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial statements. Previous studies use earnings manipulation mea-
sured by accruals quality as a proxy for fraudulent ﬁnancial reporting (Barua
et al., 2010; Jiang et al., 2010) or accounting choices (Ge et al., 2011). These
are indirect measures of fraudulent ﬁnancial reporting and have limitations in
estimating fraudulent ﬁnancial reporting behaviour (DeFond and Zhang,
2014). China also has a large publicly available data set that identiﬁes the
personal characteristics of CFOs and CEOs.
This study is important because identiﬁcation of demographic characteristics
of CFOs associated with fraud provides another dimension to assist in fraud
detection (Gepp, 2016). Consequences of fraud apply to the public, ﬁnanciers,
investors and employees. These stakeholders lose money from fraud, and the
social and ﬁnancial costs are diﬃcult to quantify. KPMG (2013) estimates that
only eight percent of fraud losses in Australian and New Zealand are fully
recovered and 49 percent of cases are only partially recovered (KPMG, 2013;
Gepp, 2016).
Disclosure of class action lawsuits and associated fraud reduces the ﬁrm’s
ﬁnancing and investment. This is because perceived information asymmetry
between stakeholders and managers increases leading to a reduction in ﬁrm
reputation. This leads to diﬃculties in obtaining external funds. A reduction in
external ﬁnancing means that the ﬁrm cannot fund proﬁtable investment (Yuan
and Zhang, 2016).
This study is a useful addition to the literature because we provide indicators
for auditors to identify fraudulent ﬁnancial reporting. Auditors are required to
continually question the honesty and integrity of management and consider
whether fraudulent ﬁnancial reporting exists (ASA 240, 2016; Kemp, 2016).
Identifying demographic characteristics of CFOs and CEOs associated with
© 2017 AFAANZ
J. Sun et al./Accounting and Finance 3
fraudulent ﬁnancial reporting create a clear set of signals for auditors to
investigate.
We ﬁnd that CFOs’ cognitions, values and perceptions estimated by age,
gender and education level are signiﬁcantly associated with fraudulent ﬁnancial
reporting. Speciﬁcally, ﬁrms with younger CFOs are more likely to issue
fraudulent ﬁnancial reports, which is consistent with the theory that younger
people are less conservative and risk averse. Male CFOs are also more likely to
engage in fraudulent ﬁnancial reporting than female CFOs. CFOs with
advanced degrees (Masters or higher) are less likely to engage in fraudulent
ﬁnancial reporting relative to those without advanced degrees. Conversely, we
ﬁnd that CFOs with higher education levels are associated with inﬂated
earnings. In addition, we show that the impact of CFO demographic
characteristics on fraudulent ﬁnancial reporting is not driven by CEO
demographic characteristics. Finally, our ﬁndings are robust after controlling
for the endogeneity problem using the propensity score matching method and
generalised method of moments.
The remainder of this article is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the
institutional background. Section 3 discusses prior literature and develops the
hypotheses. Section 4 presents the research design, which includes a discussion
of sample selection, data collection and empirical models. Section 5 presents
the empirical results and robustness tests, while Section 6 concludes the article.
2. Institutional background
The establishment of the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges in the early
1990s was a sign that China had started converting its central planning
economy into a market economy. Government regulators play a very
important role in regulating the capital market in China. Chinese regulators
were unsure whether regulatory policies were eﬃcient and have implemented
policies to check for eﬃciency in the capital market (Aharony et al., 2000). One
example of these policies is the IPO quota system and the IPO approval system,
which are used by the China Securities Regulatory Commission and other
market regulators to control the number of listed companies and the amount of
capital raised in the market. The controlled IPO system induces listed ﬁrms to
actively engage in fraudulent behaviours, even during the pre-IPO period (Chen
and Yuan, 2004; Chen et al., 2008; Aharony et al., 2010).
Another example is the delisting policy issued by the China Securities
Regulatory Commission that was established in 1998 and includes Special
Treatments and Particular Transfers. A listed ﬁrm that incurs losses in two
consecutive years is labelled as Special Treatments or ST before its trading
symbol. A Particular Transfers or PT label is assigned to a ﬁrm if it reports
more than two consecutive years of losses and these ﬁrms are subject to
additional transfer trading rules. Firms thus have a strong incentive to engage
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in opportunistic ﬁnancial reporting to prevent or remove the detrimental ST or
PT status.
The China Securities Regulatory Commission is the main regulator for listed
ﬁrms in China. Issued in 1994 by the China Securities Regulatory Commission,
the Provisional Rules and Regulations on the Administration of Stock Issues and
Trade (Provisional Rules hereafter) stipulates the rules and regulations
guaranteeing fair trading and ﬁnancial reporting. The Securities Law of
People’s Republic of China of 1999 with amendments in 2005 provides the legal
basis for the China Securities Regulatory Commission to supervise listed ﬁrms
and market intermediaries. Article 36 in Provisional Rules mandates that listed
ﬁrms must ensure that ﬁnancial statements are reported fairly in accordance
with Chinese accounting standards and that ﬁrms are held liable for damages to
investors for undetected material misstatements. Article 38 stipulates that listed
ﬁrms and top executives are to be sanctioned by the China Securities
Regulatory Commission if the ﬁnancial statement contains misleading contents
or misstatements. Sanctions against listed ﬁrms and top executives include
warnings, criticism, condemnation and monetary ﬁnes.
3. Literature review and hypotheses development
Research in economics, ﬁnance and accounting has mostly theorised that
speciﬁc noneconomic characteristics of managers do not inﬂuence company
decisions. Neoclassical economic theory assumes managers are rational
optimisers and managers’ speciﬁc personal characteristics do not inﬂuence
company decisions (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; Bamber et al., 2010). Agency
theory relaxes the perspective of neoclassical economics to assume that
individual managers can idiosyncratically inﬂuence company decisions. How-
ever, the agency perspective assumes that managers react rationally to the
company’s economic environment, monitoring mechanisms and managers’
contractual incentives (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The noneconomic char-
acteristics of managers are assumed to have no inﬂuence on the decisions made
by the company (Bamber et al., 2010).
A contrasting perspective is provided by upper echelons theory that predicts
that managers are not identical and speciﬁc diﬀerences in managers’ experi-
ences are associated with diﬀerences in essential personal values and cognitive
styles such as honesty and ethics. These diﬀerences in personal values and
cognitive styles result in diﬀerent managers making diﬀerent decisions,
particularly in complex situations lacking clear and quantiﬁable solutions
(Hambrick and Mason, 1984).
Misstatement in ﬁnancial reporting arises from fraud or error. The
distinction between the two terms according to ASA 240 (2016) is that fraud
arises from intentional misstatement while errors are unintentional. Manage-
ments are frequently in the position to commit fraud because they have the
opportunity to manipulate accounting records and prepare fraudulent ﬁnancial
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reports. This is because they are in a unique position to override controls that
otherwise appear to be operating eﬀectively (ASA 240, 2016; Kemp, 2016).
Previous research indicates that fraudulent ﬁnancial reporting scandals are
frequently preceded by entrenched lenient attitudes by management to
fraudulent behaviour (Leung and Cooper, 2003; Tan et al., 2015).
Intentional misstatements are made by individuals because individuals
(rather than ﬁrms as a whole) make decisions, and these decisions are shaped
by the personalities of individuals involved in decision-making (Kachelmeier,
2010). Executives typically embody a bundle of attributes, and their decision-
making processes reﬂect the conﬁguration of multiple characteristics rather
than individual ones in isolation (Carpenter et al., 2004).
Upper echelons theory explains that top executives’ cognitions, values and
perceptions predict organisational outcomes such as strategic choices and
performance (Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Carpenter et al., 2004; Hambrick,
2007) including fraudulent ﬁnancial reporting. Indeed, research in manage-
ment, behavioural economics and psychology has documented that signiﬁcant
personal characteristics-based diﬀerences exist in leadership styles, commu-
nicative skills, conservatism, risk aversion and decision-making and that these
diﬀerences play a signiﬁcant role in shaping an organisation’s behaviour. For
example, Daboub et al. (1995) ﬁnd that the characteristics of top executives,
including work experience, age and formal business education, are associated
with a ﬁrm’s illegal activity. Evidence exists that CEOs and other top managers
have large individual-speciﬁc heterogeneity in their management styles. These
style diﬀerences explain a substantial portion of the variation in ﬁrms’ capital
structures, investment decisions and organisational structures (Bertrand and
Schoar, 2003; Xuan, 2009).
Accounting research also documents that individual executives exert signif-
icant inﬂuence over a wide range of ﬁrms’ accounting policy choices and
outcomes (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; Ge et al., 2011). Beaudoin et al. (2015)
conduct an experimental study and ﬁnd that CFOs’ fraudulent ﬁnancial
reporting decisions are inﬂuenced by personal ﬁnancial incentives and earnings
management ethics. Wang and Fargher (2015) ﬁnd that the internal auditors’
assessed fraud risk is higher when senior management’s attitude towards ethics
and integrity is relatively poor. Dyreng et al. (2010) report that individual
executives play a signiﬁcant role in explaining the level of tax avoidance by
companies. Bamber et al. (2010) ﬁnd that individual characteristics of
executives are signiﬁcantly associated with management forecasts. In addition,
Yang (2012) reports that manager-speciﬁc forecasting style and creditability are
associated with the strength of market reactions to management earnings
forecast releases.
We focus on observable demographic characteristics of managers to
operationalise values, perceptions and cognitive biases of CFOs rather than
psychological dimensions. Psychological dimensions are typically measured
using tests and questionnaires. Senior management is reluctant to respond to
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tests and questionnaires and recognised psychological tests have been devel-
oped for the general public and are not reliably applicable to senior
management (Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996;
Hambrick, 2007).
Bamber et al. (2010) performed a widespread review of the literature in
strategic management, career counselling, sociology, psychology and business
education to identify demographic characteristics that operationalise managers’
values, perceptions and cognitive biases. Their review identiﬁed age, gender and
educational background as characteristics that credibly represent managers’
values, perceptions and cognitive biases referred to in upper echelons theory
and are selected for this study.
Older executives are more concerned about their ﬁnancial and career security
(Wiersema and Bantel, 1992) and have well-established social circles, spending
traits and expectations about retirement income. Older executives are also more
risk averse (Abdel-khalik, 2014). The age of a manager can also be viewed as a
proxy for the extent of experience and as a signal of their resistance to risk-
taking and change. Ruegger and King (1992) ﬁnd that older participants are
more ethical than younger participants in a survey of 2196 business school
students. Deshpande (1997) ﬁnds similar results using 252 managers as
respondents.
Herrmann and Datta (2006) ﬁnd that older top executives tend to be more
conservative and risk averse. Sundaran and Yermack (2007) report that CEOs
become more ethical and conservative as they age. It has been found that CEO
age is negatively related to ﬁnancial restatements and ﬁrms’ meeting, or
beating, analyst earnings forecasts (Huang et al., 2012).
In summary, existing studies have documented that older managers are more
ethical and risk averse than younger managers. We therefore hypothesise that
older CFOs are less likely to be involved in unethical fraudulent ﬁnancial
reporting than their younger counterparts. This leads to our ﬁrst hypothesis:
H1: Older CFOs are associated with less fraudulent ﬁnancial reporting.
The literature in cognitive psychology, behavioural economics and manage-
ment has documented that signiﬁcant gender diﬀerences exist in risk aversion,
conservatism and ethical behaviour (Bernardi and Arnold, 1997; Sunden and
Surette, 1998; Schubert, 2006; Croson and Gneezy, 2009). Evidence suggests
that gender is a signiﬁcant factor in the determination of ethical conduct and
that females are more ethical than males (Ruegger and King, 1992; Deshpande,
1997).
Empirical evidence suggests that the behavioural diﬀerences between genders
have important implications for ﬁnancial reporting quality. For example,
Heminway (2007) argues that women are less likely to manipulate earnings and
other disclosures because they have higher ethical levels and are more
trustworthy than men. Barua et al. (2010) provide evidence that companies
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with female CFOs provide higher quality ﬁnancial reports. In addition,
research ﬁnds that ﬁrms with female directors have higher earnings quality and
less earnings management (Srinidhi et al., 2011; Gavious et al., 2012). Abbott
et al. (2012) ﬁnd that having female directors on the board is associated with
fewer ﬁnancial restatements.
Ho et al. (2015) ﬁnd female CEOs are more conservative than male CEOs
regarding ﬁnancial reporting. However, conﬂicting Australian evidence ﬁnds
that female partners identify fewer going-concern decisions for ﬁnancially
distressed clients (Hossain et al., 2016). Other research indicates that female
CFOs are more conservative, risk averse and ethical than male CFOs. Capezio
and Mavisakalyan (2016) conﬁrm the prediction that an increase in women’s
representation on company boards is associated with a decreased probability of
fraud for publicly listed companies in Australia. On balance, we expect that
female CFOs are less likely to be associated with fraudulent ﬁnancial reporting.
This leads to our second hypothesis as follows:
H2: Female CFOs are associated with less fraudulent ﬁnancial reporting.
The upper echelons literature suggests that education level reﬂects managers’
abilities and skills (Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Chatterjee and Hambrick,
2007; Nadkarni and Herrmann, 2010; Burkert and Lueg, 2013). The general
argument is that better-educated top executives have a greater cognitive
complexity and ability to absorb new ideas and implement more eﬀective
strategies (Dabila and Foster, 2005, 2007; Naranjo-Gil et al., 2009). Moreover,
better-educated managers are more capable of discriminating among an
extensive variety of alternatives to solve organisational problems and make
better decisions because of their greater cognitive ability to process and analyse
information (e.g. Herrmann and Datta, 2006; Chatterjee and Hambrick, 2007;
Nadkarni and Herrmann, 2010). Based on this line of research, Cheng et al.
(2010) provide evidence that Chinese ﬁrms headed by a board chairperson with
a higher level of education report better ﬁnancial performance.
The ethics literature documents that individuals with a higher education level
are more ethical than those with a lower education level. For example, Jones
and Gautschi (1988) ﬁnd respondents with more education have higher ethical
beliefs than those with less education, and Lane et al. (1988) ﬁnd similar
results. Deshpande (1997) ﬁnds managers with a higher education level are
more ethical than their counterparts with a lower education level. This indicates
that senior executives with higher education levels are less likely to be involved
in fraudulent ﬁnancial reporting because they are more proﬁcient in running
their business and have higher ethical beliefs.
However, some literature argues that individuals with a higher educational
level can command more job opportunities and higher compensation, which
could lead them to be overly optimistic or more aggressive than others. For
example, Bertrand and Schoar (2003) ﬁnd that managers with an MBA degree
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are relatively more aggressive than others. A higher education level could also
lead to top executives displaying more narcissism than others, which could
induce them to be involved in fraud. In addition, some types of fraud require
managers to have a higher education level because the fraud schemes are
complex. For example, accrual-based earnings manipulation is achieved by
changing accounting methods or estimates when presenting a given transaction
in a ﬁnancial statement.
Prior research indicates that higher education levels are associated with less
fraudulent ﬁnancial reporting. Alternatively, some ﬁnancial frauds require a
certain level of ﬁnancial expertise likely be acquired through formal education.
Therefore, we predict that fraudulent ﬁnancial reporting is associated with
education level without predicting a direction, leading to our third hypothesis
as follows:
H3: The education level of CFOs is associated with fraudulent ﬁnancial
reporting.
4. Research design
4.1. Sample selection and data
Our sample of 18 863 pooled clients’ ﬁrm-year observations spans 2000
to 2014. The ﬁnancial data for calculating all the variables are obtained
from the China Securities Markets and Accounting Research database. We
begin with 27 409 ﬁrm-year observations with no missing values on total
assets. After deleting ﬁrms with missing data, our sample consists of 14 578
ﬁrm-year observations not involved in fraudulent ﬁnancial reporting and
4285 ﬁrm-year observations sanctioned because of fraudulent ﬁnancial
reporting.
The China Securities Regulatory Commission identiﬁes companies commit-
ting fraud and imposes ﬁnes on the company and their senior management. The
companies are required as far as possible to correct the fraud. Sanction reports
relating to these frauds provide information on the exact nature of the fraud,
associated reasons for the penalties, the originally released accounting amounts
and the exact periods aﬀected by the fraudulent ﬁnancial reporting. This
information is provided on the China Securities Regulatory Commission, the
Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange websites. We
download the sanction reports from these websites and manually collect the
reasons for sanctions, the related renminbi (RMB) amounts and the fraud
periods from these reports. The China Securities Regulatory Commission, the
Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange issued 3453
sanction reports for fraudulent ﬁnancial reporting from 2000 to 2014, which
relates to 4285 ﬁrm-years. The types of fraudulent ﬁnancial reporting include
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inﬂated earnings, ﬁctitious assets, material omissions and other material
misstatements.3 Each sanction report includes one or several types of
fraudulent ﬁnancial reporting.
4.2. Empirical models
We estimate the following logistic regression for the pooled sample (and also
for a matched sample) to test whether CFO demographic characteristics
inﬂuence fraudulent ﬁnancial reporting:
Fraud ¼ b0 þ b1CFO DEMOþ b2SIZEþ b3LEVþ b4BMþ b5S GROW
þ b6LOSSþ b7ROAþ b8F AGEþ b9BIG4þ b10SEO
þ b11G INDEXþ b12CFO TENUR þ b13CFO SHARE
þ Year FixedEffectsþ Industry Fixed Effectsþ e;
ð1Þ
where the dependent variable is fraudulent ﬁnancial reporting denoted by
Fraud. Fraud equals 1 when, due to fraudulent ﬁnancial reporting, a ﬁrm is
sanctioned by China Securities Regulatory Commission, the Shanghai Stock
Exchange or the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, otherwise Fraud equals 0. CFO
demographic characteristics include CFO_AGE, CFO_GEN, and CFO_EDU
denoted by CFO_DEMO. CFO_AGE is a CFO’s natural logarithm of age.
CFO_GEN is a dummy variable, which equals 1 when a ﬁrm’s CFO is female
and 0 if the CFO is male. CFO_EDU is a CFO’s education level. CFO_EDU
equals 1 for a CFO with a high school diploma, 2 for a CFO with a college
degree, 3 for a CFO with a bachelor’s degree, 4 for a CFO with a master’s
degree and 5 for a CFO with a doctoral degree.
We control for factors identiﬁed in previous research that potentially
inﬂuence ﬁrms’ fraudulent ﬁnancial reporting. We include SIZE, measured by
the natural log of a ﬁrm’s total assets to control for ﬁrm size. Dechow and
Dichev (2002) suggest that smaller ﬁrms are more likely to be involved in
earnings management. We include LEV, measured by the total debt divided by
total assets (Subramaniam et al., 2009; Oliveira et al., 2011; Kent and Zunker,
2013; Tao and Hutchinson, 2013). Menon and Williams (2004) suggest that
high growth ﬁrms are more likely to report low-quality ﬁnancial information,
so we control for book-to-market value (BM) and sales growth rate
(S_GROW). Following Matsumoto (2002), we include LOSS because loss
ﬁrms are less likely to be involved in fraudulent ﬁnancial reporting. We also
include return on assets (ROA), measured by net income divided by total assets
3 Delaying ﬁnancial reporting is also part of some sanction reports. We do not include it
in our sample because delaying ﬁnancial reporting is not considered a form of fraudulent
ﬁnancial reporting.
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to control for ﬁrm performance (Kent and Zunker, 2013; He et al., 2016b).
Huang et al. (2012) suggest that ﬁrms with higher ROA are less likely to
manipulate earnings. We also include F_AGE, measured by the number of
years a ﬁrm has been listed (Huang et al., 2012; Abdel-khalik, 2014). We
include BIG4 to control for audit quality, as Big 4 audit ﬁrms are associated
with higher audit quality (Fargher et al., 2014; Miglani et al., 2015).
Prior studies have documented that many diﬀerences exist between state-
owned companies and nonstate-owned companies, so we include SOE as a
control variable (Liu et al., 2011). We also include G_INDEX, measured as a
corporate governance index developed by Nankai University Corporate
Governance Center.4 CFO tenure is one of the factors that might aﬀect ethical
reasoning and therefore inﬂuence ﬁnancial reporting decisions (Pennino, 2002),
so we add CFO_TENUR as a control variable.
Jiang et al. (2010) document CFOs’ equity incentive as one of the factors
aﬀecting earnings manipulation behaviour, so we include total shares held by
CFO (CFO_SHARE) to control for CFOs’ equity incentive. In addition,
considering that the macroeconomic environment (Kent et al., 2008) and
industry conditions aﬀect a ﬁrm’s fraudulent ﬁnancial reporting behaviour, we
also control for the year and industry dummies in Equation (1). Table 1 deﬁnes
the variables.
Table 2 describes the distribution of each type of fraudulent ﬁnancial
reporting by year. The number of each type of fraudulent reporting tends to
grow each year suggesting that the Chinese government pays increasing
attention to regulating public ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial reporting behaviour. This
increase could also be related to increased business activity and therefore
increased fraud for companies during the period of study.
Table 3, Panel A provides descriptive statistics for fraud ﬁrms and nonfraud
ﬁrms. We also compare the mean and median values of the CFO demographic
characteristics and ﬁrm characteristics between the two groups. More than 90
percent of CFOs are males, and no signiﬁcant gender diﬀerence exists between
the two groups. The average age of CFOs is around 46, and CFOs in nonfraud
ﬁrms are slightly older than CFOs in fraud ﬁrms. The average CFO education
level is a bachelor’s degree, and no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in education level exists
between the two groups. Fraud ﬁrms are signiﬁcantly smaller, have higher
leverage, poorer performance, poorer corporate governance, longer listed years
and slower growth relative to nonfraud ﬁrms. The fraud ﬁrms are less likely to
hire one of the Big 4 ﬁrms as their external auditor. Nonstate-owned ﬁrms are
4 The corporate governance index developed by Nankai University Corporate
Governance Center is a widely used index in corporate governance research in China.
The Center issues a corporate governance index of listed ﬁrms in China each year. The
index includes six aspects: shareholder governance, board of supervisor governance,
board governance, managerial governance, information disclosure and stakeholder
governance. Each aspect is assigned a score according to detailed standards. We use the
average score of these six aspects as a proxy for corporate governance.
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less likely to commit fraud than state-owned ﬁrms. The results of the
descriptive statistics indicate that fraud and nonfraud ﬁrms are signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent in their underlying characteristics conﬁrming the necessity to control
for these diﬀerences.
Table 3, Panel B shows the Pearson product–moment correlations between
variables.5 Most of the correlations are between 0.20 and 0.20. The highest
Table 1
Deﬁnition of variables
Variable Deﬁnition
Dependent variables
Fraud 1 if a listed ﬁrm is sanctioned by the China Securities Regulatory
Commission, the Shanghai Stock Exchange or the Shenzhen Stock
Exchange due to fraudulent ﬁnancial reporting and 0 otherwise.
Independent variables
CFO_AGE The natural logarithm of CFO age in year t.
CFO_GEN 1 if a listed ﬁrm’s CFO is female and 0 otherwise.
CFO_EDU 1 for CFO with a high school diploma, 2 for CFO with a college
degree, 3 for CFO with a bachelor’s degree, 4 for CFO with a
master’s degree and 5 for CFO with a doctoral degree.
Control variables
SIZE The natural logarithm of a listed ﬁrm’s total assets at the end of year t.
LEV A listed ﬁrm’s total debt in year t scaled by total assets at the end
of year t.
BM A listed ﬁrm’s book value of equity divided by total assets at the end
of year t.
S_GROW Percentage growth in a listed ﬁrm’s sales from year t  1 to year t.
LOSS 1 if a listed ﬁrm records negative net income in year t and 0 otherwise.
ROA A listed ﬁrm’s net income in year t divided by total assets at the end
of year t.
F_AGE The number of years a listed ﬁrm has been listed since its IPO year
to year t.
BIG4 1 if a listed ﬁrm hires one of the Big 4 international audit ﬁrms
as its auditor and 0 otherwise.
SOE 1 if the ﬁrm is ultimately controlled by the Chinese government
and 0 otherwise.
G_INDEX The average value of a listed ﬁrm’s corporate governance score
constructed by The Nankai University Corporate Governance
Center.
CFO_TENUR The number of years that a CFO has worked for a listed ﬁrm.
CFO_SHARE The number of shares held by a CFO divided by the total number
of shares outstanding of a listed ﬁrm in year t.
5 The Spearman rank-order correlations are similar to the Pearson product–moment
correlations.
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Pearson correlation is between BM and SIZE at 0.361. The correlations do not
indicate any serious collinearity problems.6
5. Results
5.1. Regression results
Table 4 presents the logistic regression results for Equation (1). Column (1)
shows the association between CFO age and fraudulent ﬁnancial reporting.
The coeﬃcient on CFO_AGE (Para = 0.014, v2 = 12.25) is negative and
signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level, which indicates that older CFOs are less likely
to engage in fraudulent ﬁnancial reporting, supporting Hypothesis 1. This
ﬁnding is consistent with the upper echelons theory that older top executives
are more ethical and risk averse (Ruegger and King, 1992; Sundaran and
Yermack, 2007; Huang et al., 2012).
Column (2) reports the association of CFO gender with fraudulent ﬁnancial
reporting. The coeﬃcient on CFO_GEN (Para = 0.257, v2 = 15.38) is
negative and signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level, which indicates that female
CFOs are less likely to engage in fraudulent ﬁnancial reporting, supporting
Hypothesis 2. This ﬁnding is consistent with the theory that females are more
Table 2
The distribution of diﬀerent types of fraudulent ﬁnancial reporting by year
Type
of fraud
Inﬂated
earnings
Fictitious
assets
Material
omissions
Other
material
misstatements Total
2000 9 12 16 26 63
2001 30 41 82 56 209
2002 14 22 41 66 143
2003 29 39 87 73 228
2004 37 63 67 73 240
2005 26 61 65 51 203
2006 31 60 75 61 227
2007 26 42 50 44 162
2008 30 64 80 80 254
2009 14 97 89 102 302
2010 32 88 95 138 353
2011 5 95 124 113 337
2012 7 146 258 155 566
2013 26 159 262 227 674
2014 46 110 142 102 400
Total 362 1099 2133 1367 4961
6 All of the VIF scores are below 3.96.
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ethical and risk averse than males (Ruegger and King, 1992; Barua et al., 2010;
Ho et al., 2015; Palvia et al., 2015).
Column (3) reports the association of CFO education level on fraudulent
ﬁnancial reporting. The coeﬃcient on CFO_EUD (Para = 0.032, v2 = 3.05) is
negative and signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level, which partially indicates that
CFOs with a higher education level are less likely to engage in fraudulent
ﬁnancial reporting.
Table 4
Logistic regression results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CFO_AGE 0.014*** 0.011***
(12.25) (9.68)
CFO_GEN 0.257*** 0.275**
(15.38) (6.07)
CFO_EDU 0.032* 0.029*
(3.05) (2.97)
SIZE 0.040** 0.034** 0.044*** 0.072***
(5.83) (4.29) (6.85) (17.53)
LEV 0.014 0.010 0.001 0.001
(0.88) (0.51) (0.346) (0.379)
BM 0.428*** 0.452*** 0.443*** 0.435***
(60.99) (67.30) (64.75) (60.88)
S_GROW 0.159*** 0.165*** 0.162*** 0.150***
(20.95) (22.39) (21.77) (18.19)
LOSS 0.792*** 0.793*** 0.795*** 0.811***
(93.48) (96.05) (97.57) (101.85)
ROA 0.029*** 0.028*** 0.029*** 0.030***
(13.52) (12.93) (13.03) (14.33)
F_AGE 0.050*** 0.053*** 0.052*** 0.044***
(68.89) (70.86) (69.91) (57.46)
BIG4 0.021** 0.024** 0.020** 0.017**
(5.12) (5.47) (5.01) (4.16)
SOE 0.661*** 0.647*** 0.636*** 0.613***
(58.84) (56.86) (52.68) (50.21)
G_INDEX 0.082*** 0.084*** 0.079*** 0.087***
(23.59) (24.55) (21.65) (25.60)
CFO_TENUR 0.112*** 0.108*** 0.119*** 0.117***
(53.96) (52.64) (55.94) (53.08)
CFO_SHARE 0.015 0.017 0.013 0.015
(1.84) (1.98) (1.64) (1.79)
Year ﬁxed eﬀect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry ﬁxed eﬀect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Generalised pseudo-R2 0.057 0.058 0.059 0.063
p-value <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Observation 18 863 18 863 18 863 18 863
*, **, and ***Statistically signiﬁcant results at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels (two-tails),
respectively. Please see the deﬁnitions of the variables in Table 1.
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Finally, column (4) presents the joint associations betweenCFOage, gender and
education level on fraudulent ﬁnancial reporting. The coeﬃcients on CFO_AGE,
CFO_GEN and CFO_EDU (Para = 0.011, 0.275 and 0.029, v2 = 9.68, 6.07
and 3.54, respectively) are similar to those in Columns (1), (2) and (3).
5.2. Types of fraudulent ﬁnancial reporting
We treated all types of fraudulent ﬁnancial reporting similarly in the prior
analysis when estimating the association between CFO demographic charac-
teristics and fraudulent ﬁnancial reporting. However, it remains unclear how
CFO demographic characteristics inﬂuence diﬀerent types of fraudulent
ﬁnancial reporting. In the following analysis, we thus divide fraudulent
ﬁnancial reporting into four types: inﬂated earnings, ﬁctitious assets, material
omissions and other material misstatements.7 Table 4 reports the regression
results of the joint associations between CFO demographic characteristics on
each type of fraudulent ﬁnancial reporting. We ﬁnd that higher education levels
are associated with inﬂated earnings at the ﬁve percent level, while education
level is not signiﬁcant in explaining other material misstatements. Otherwise,
we ﬁnd similar results for the associations between CFO age and gender on the
other types of fraudulent ﬁnancial reporting (Table 5).
5.3. CEO demographic characteristics
Hunton et al. (2011) argue that a ﬁrm’s CEO primarily creates the tone at the
top and that such a tone is associated with earnings quality. Extracting CEOs’
traits of ethical leadership from corporate narrative language, Parelli and Pedrini
(2015) ﬁnd that this tone at the top is signiﬁcantly associatedwith ﬁrms’ aggressive
ﬁnancial reporting behaviour. Saxton (2015) aﬃrms this ﬁnding.CFOs are agents
of CEOs and CEOs have the power to replace CFOs who do not follow their
orders (Mian, 2001; Fee and Hadlock, 2004). Our concern is that the ﬁndings of
the associations between CFO demographic characteristics and fraudulent
ﬁnancial reporting are driven by CEO demographic characteristics. To rule out
this concern, we follow Jiang et al. (2010) by estimating the following model:
Fraud ¼ b0 þ b1CFO DEMOþ b2CEO DEMOþ b3SIZEþ b4LEV
þ b5BMþ b6S GROWþ b7LOSSþ b8ROAþ b9FIRM AGE
þ b10BIG4þ b11SEOþ b12G INDEXþ b13CFO SHARE
þ Year FixedEffectsþ Industry Fixed Effectsþ e;
ð2Þ
7 Each sanction report could include one or several types of fraud. For example, a
sanction report could include both inﬂated earnings and ﬁctitious assets.
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where CEO_DEMO represents CEO demographic characteristics, including
CEO_AGE, CEO_GEN and CEO_EDU. Other variables are the same as those
used in Equation (1).
Table 6 reports the logistic regression results of Equation (2) based on a
propensity score matching sample8. The results in columns (1), (4) and (7) are
the associations between CFO demographic characteristics and fraudulent
ﬁnancial reporting. The results in columns (2), (5) and (8) are the associations
between CEO demographic characteristics on fraudulent ﬁnancial reporting.
Consistent with the ﬁndings in prior studies, CEO age, gender and education
level are signiﬁcantly associated with fraudulent ﬁnancial reporting. The
results in columns (3), (6) and (9) are the joint associations between CFO and
CEO demographic characteristics on fraudulent ﬁnancial reporting. We ﬁnd
that the associations between CFO demographics characteristics on fraudu-
lent ﬁnancial reporting do not disappear after adding CEO demographic
characteristics into the regressions. Therefore, CEO relations do not drive the
CFO results.
5.4. Endogeneity
The results in Table 4 provide preliminary evidence that CFO demographic
characteristics are associated with fraudulent ﬁnancial reporting. However,
‘endogeneity has always been present and recognised as a problem that
undermines causal inference’ (Gippel et al., 2015, p. 143). We are concerned
that speciﬁc companies with fraudulent ﬁnancial reporting attract CFOs that
are younger, female, and with lower education levels.
We reduce the problem of endogeneity by ensuring that we base our
predictions on strong theory. Poor theory development adds to econometric
problems associated with endogeneity (Gippel et al., 2015). In addition, we are
careful to recognise that we have not demonstrated a causal relationship
between CFO demographic characteristics and fraudulent ﬁnancial reporting.
In addition, two econometric solutions are provided to ensure that we can be
conﬁdent regarding the logic and direction of the relationship between CFO
demographic characteristics and fraudulent ﬁnancial reporting. First, we use
the propensity score matching method to ensure the results are not driven by
8 When using PSM scores, we set the calliper at 0.05, to match each client-year involved
in fraudulent ﬁnancial reporting with a client-year not involved in fraudulent ﬁnancial
reporting. Speciﬁcally, we estimate Equation (2) after excluding CEOs’ and CFOs’
demographic characteristics by year and the propensity score is calculated for each
client-year as the predicted value. Then, we match each client-year involved in
fraudulent ﬁnancial reporting with a client-year not involved in fraudulent ﬁnancial
reporting which has the closet propensity score in the same year. We restrict the
diﬀerence in propensity scores of each pair to 0.05. In this manner, we obtain a PSM
sample including 3964 client-years involved in fraudulent ﬁnancial reporting and 3964
client-years not involved in fraudulent ﬁnancial reporting.
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ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors because the descriptive evidence in Table 3 shows
fundamental diﬀerences between characteristics of fraud and nonfraud ﬁrms.
This method means that the sample ﬁrms have similar characteristics with
similar probabilities of being fraud ﬁrms.
Table 5
CFO characteristics and diﬀerent types of corporate violations
Inﬂated
earnings
Fictitious
assets
Material
omissions
Other
material
misstatements
CFO_AGE 0.026** 0.032*** 0.045*** 0.021**
(4.79) (8.51) (10.11) (4.02)
CFO_GEN 1.016*** 0.096*** 0.712*** 0.382**
(22.06) (9.28) (15.89) (4.40)
CFO_EDU 0.053** 0.269** 0.224* 0.020
(3.86) (6.00) (2.92) (1.37)
SIZE 0.553*** 0.024 0.148*** 0.202***
(52.99) (1.74) (32.40) (48.60)
LEV 0.106* 0.087*** 0.019 0.019
(3.01) (7.33) (0.93) (0.94)
BM 0.308** 0.378*** 0.076 0.165***
(6.02) (27.09) (1.57) (6.70)
S_GROW 0.148*** 0.128** 0.146*** 0.152***
(17.07) (4.45) (7.49) (6.84)
LOSS 0.423*** 0.863*** 0.675*** 0.482***
(7.04) (84.61) (75.63) (42.76)
ROA 0.018 0.038** 0.012 0.017*
(1.05) (5.07) (0.92) (3.07)
F_AGE 0.063*** 0.018*** 0.72*** 0.054***
(25.34) (10.43) (71.69) (72.85)
BIG4 0.016** 0.014** 0.010** 0.018**
(4.25) (3.92) (3.69) (4.51)
SOE 0.196 0.523*** 0.425*** 0.549***
(1.99) (65.94) (56.58) (78.12)
G_INDEX 0.068*** 0.060*** 0.065*** 0.071***
(16.44) (13.19) (15.38) (17.53)
CFO_TENUR 0.092* 0.099*** 0.084*** 0.080***
(3.79) (36.79) (33.15) (24.99)
CFO_SHARE 0.011 0.015 0.014 0.013
(1.36) (1.86) (1.77) (1.59)
Year ﬁxed eﬀect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry ﬁxed eﬀect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Generalised pseudo-R2 0.051 0.057 0.057 0.050
p-value <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Observation 14 940 15 845 16 279 15 677
*, **, and ***Statistically signiﬁcant results at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels (two-tails),
respectively. Please see the deﬁnitions of the variables in Table 1.
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We estimate Equation (1) based on the propensity score matching method to
control for diﬀerences in characteristics between fraud and nonfraud ﬁrms
(Armstrong et al., 2010). Speciﬁcally, we estimate the following model by year:
ProbitðFraudÞ ¼ a0 þ a1SIZEþ a2LEVþ a3BMþ a4S GROW
þ a5LOSSþ a6ROAþ a7FAGEþ a8BIG4þ a9SEO
þ a10G INDEX
þ a10CFO TENURþ a12CFO SHAREþ ej;t:
ð3Þ
First, we identify 4285 ﬁrm-year observations sanctioned by government
agents, and 14 578 ﬁrm-year observations not sanctioned by government agents.
Second, we use propensity score matching to match each sanctioned observation
with each nonsanctioned observation. Speciﬁcally, we estimate Equation (3) by
year and the propensity score is calculated for each ﬁrm-year as the predicted
value.We thenmatch each fraud observation to a nonfraud observation with the
closest propensity score in the same year. We restrict the diﬀerence in propensity
scores of each pair to 0.05. In this manner, we obtain a propensity scorematching
sample of 3964 fraud observations9 and 3964 nonfraud observations. We
estimate Equation (1) using this matched sample. Table 7 shows the regression
results based on the propensity score matching sample, which are similar to those
based on the pooled sample. In particular, the estimated coeﬃcient on
CFO_EDU is negative at the 5 percent signiﬁcance level. The results based on
the propensity scorematching sample rule out the alternative explanation that the
association between CFO demographic characteristics and fraudulent ﬁnancial
reporting is driven by ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics.
Second, we use generalised method of moments (GMM) to assess the
endogeneity problem. This method uses the lagged values of dependent
variables as instruments and is considered more appropriate than two-stage
least squares (2SLS) for our study. The validity of 2SLS regressions largely
depends on the choice of instrumental variables in the ﬁrst stage. At least one
instrumental variable is required when completing the 2SLS test and this
instrumental variable should have an impact on CFO characteristics but not on
the probability of ﬁnancial statement fraud. The problem is that it is diﬃcult to
ﬁnd a good instrumental variable in our analysis. The lagged values used in
most research may not be good instrumental variables because these variables
can be correlated. It is more appropriate to apply GMM using lagged CFO
characteristics when appropriate exogenous variables are not available and
when the endogenous variable is highly serially correlated (for our example,
9 Three hundred and twenty-one sanctioned observations were eliminated from the
sample because they did not match.
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they are the same for gender and education level and highly correlated for age
(Areliano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998).
The results of the GMM regression are presented in Table 8. Overall, the
GMM regression reports conﬁrm our earlier ﬁndings suggesting that fraud
companies do not select CFOs that are younger, male, and with lower
education. Unreported results of a 2SLS test conﬁrm these results.
Table 7
Logistic regression results based on the propensity score matching method
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CFO_AGE 0.017*** 0.011***
(15.92) (9.68)
CFO_GEN 0.263** 0.278**
(5.94) (6.22)
CFO_EDU 0.035** 0.033**
(3.96) (3.89)
SIZE 0.038** 0.031** 0.042*** 0.068***
(5.16) (4.07) (6.79) (15.42)
LEV 0.013 0.008 0.001 0.001
(0.81) (0.47) (0.332) (0.357)
BM 0.407*** 0.441*** 0.425*** 0.419***
(57.49) (62.90) (60.49) (58.93)
S_GROW 0.148*** 0.153*** 0.157*** 0.139***
(17.07) (19.65) (20.08) (14.12)
LOSS 0.776*** 0.781*** 0.783*** 0.793***
(85.69) (87.24) (86.58) (92.55)
ROA 0.025*** 0.026*** 0.027*** 0.030***
(10.94) (11.57) (12.63) (14.54)
F_AGE 0.047*** 0.051*** 0.050*** 0.040***
(62.19) (67.95) (68.22) (51.07)
BIG4 0.019** 0.021** 0.016** 0.015**
(4.84) (4.97) (4.29) (4.08)
SOE 0.649*** 0.638*** 0.619*** 0.595***
(55.23) (52.94) (49.87) (43.39)
G_INDEX 0.077*** 0.079*** 0.073*** 0.075***
(20.15) (21.63) (18.20) (19.54)
CFO_TENUR 0.105*** 0.107*** 0.102*** 0.101***
(47.59) (48.46) (46.39) (45.28)
CFO_SHARE 0.013 0.015 0.012 0.013
(1.59) (1.77) (1.51) (1.62)
Year ﬁxed eﬀect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry ﬁxed eﬀect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Generalised pseudo-R2 0.061 0.063 0.064 0.067
p-value <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Observation 7928 7928 7928 7928
*, **, and ***Statistically signiﬁcant results at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels (two-tailed),
respectively. Please see the deﬁnitions of the variables in Table 1.
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6. Conclusions
We examine whether CFO demographic characteristics inﬂuence a ﬁrm’s
fraudulent ﬁnancial reporting in a sample of Chinese publicly listed ﬁrms.
According to the upper echelons theory, top executives’ demographic charac-
teristics can be used as reasonable proxies for underlying diﬀerences in
cognitions, values and perceptions, which can inﬂuence strategic choices and
Table 8
Logistic regression results based on the generalised method of moments (GMM)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CFO_AGEt1 0.010*** 0.009***
(8.48) (8.01)
CFO_GEN t1 0.237** 0.226**
(5.02) (4.83)
CFO_EDU t1 0.033** 0.030**
(4.54) (3.96)
SIZE 0.035** 0.031** 0.040*** 0.064***
(5.07) (3.96) (6.59) (14.73)
LEV 0.011 0.007 0.001 0.001
(0.78) (0.46) (0.330) (0.355)
BM 0.403*** 0.435*** 0.420*** 0.412***
(56.24) (61.28) (59.65) (56.81)
S_GROW 0.146*** 0.150*** 0.154*** 0.137***
(16.59) (18.23) (19.84) (14.06)
LOSS 0.762*** 0.767*** 0.770*** 0.785***
(80.18) (82.51) (83.06) (87.22)
ROA 0.021*** 0.023*** 0.025*** 0.027***
(9.15) (9.84) (11.29) (12.34)
F_AGE 0.041*** 0.045*** 0.044*** 0.037***
(53.75) (57.83) (58.67) (46.37)
BIG4 0.020** 0.023** 0.018** 0.016**
(4.97) (5.21) (4.67) (4.43)
SOE 0.602*** 0.609*** 0.594*** 0.583***
(47.39) (50.32) (45.16) (40.28)
G_INDEX 0.070*** 0.075*** 0.068*** 0.071***
(18.25) (20.09) (17.30) (19.02)
CFO_TENUR 0.095*** 0.098*** 0.093*** 0.091***
(41.03) (44.57) (40.12) (39.83)
CFO_SHARE 0.011 0.013 0.010 0.010
(1.50) (1.62) (1.44) (1.48)
Year ﬁxed eﬀect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry ﬁxed eﬀect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Generalised pseudo-R2 0.062 0.067 0.069 0.072
p-value <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Observation 18 863 18 863 18 863 18 863
*, **, and ***Statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels (two-tailed), respectively.
Please see the deﬁnitions of the variables in Table 1.
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performance. As CFOs are the primary executives involved in the ﬁnancial
reporting process, CFO demographic characteristics should aﬀect a ﬁrm’s
fraudulent ﬁnancial reporting activities. Consistent with this expectation, we
ﬁnd that CFO age, gender and education level are signiﬁcantly associated with
fraudulent ﬁnancial reporting in China. The results are not driven by the
diﬀerences in characteristics between fraud and nonfraud ﬁrms and remain
robust when we divide the fraudulent ﬁnancial reporting into four diﬀerent
types with the exception of inﬂated earnings. Finally, we rule out the alternative
explanation that the associations between CEO demographic characteristics are
driving the ﬁndings.
It is widely understood that a company’s CEO exerts major inﬂuence on the
ﬁrm’s strategic choices and performance. The majority of prior studies have
focused on the association between a CEO’s personal traits and the quality of
ﬁnancial reporting. Our ﬁndings of the signiﬁcant association between CFO
demographic characteristics and a ﬁrm’s fraudulent ﬁnancial reporting suggest
that although CFOs report to CEOs, they can impose their own inﬂuence on
ﬁnancial reporting. The ﬁndings of this study provide some insight into the
antecedents of managerial fraud, that is CFO demographic characteristics.
Our results imply that regulators in Australia require a mechanism for
identifying fraudulent ﬁnancial reporting in a similar way to the Chinese
government. The ﬁnding that female CFOs are associated with less fraudulent
ﬁnancial reporting provides support for legislative or regulatory eﬀorts in many
countries to increase the proportion of women on boards.10 Furthermore, the
ﬁndings of a signiﬁcant association between CFO demographic characteristics
and fraudulent ﬁnancial reporting helps external auditors better assess the risk
of material misstatement when planning an audit by considering demographic
information of their audit client’s CFO.
The current article acknowledges several limitations. First, fraudulent
ﬁnancial reporting is aﬀected by many factors, such as top executives’ external
and internal incentives, corporate governance, ﬁrm characteristics and the legal
environment. Although we have controlled for as many factors as we can, our
ﬁndings could still be driven by omitted variables. Second, the signiﬁcant
association between CFO demographic characteristics and fraudulent ﬁnancial
reporting is not a causal relationship. Our results do not indicate that male,
younger, or less educated CFOs speciﬁcally cause fraudulent ﬁnancial
reporting. Rather, our ﬁndings merely indicate that male, younger, or less
educated CFOs are more likely to engage in fraudulent ﬁnancial reporting
relative to their female, older, or higher-educated counterparts. Last, these
demographic characteristics are arguably limited or incomplete proxies of
10 For example, Norway has passed legislation mandating a minimum of 40 percent
female board representation with penalties for noncompliance. Also, Spain and Sweden
require female board representation of at least 40 percent and 25 percent, respectively.
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CFOs’ cognitions, values and perceptions. Future research may try to identify
more reliable measures to examine this issue.
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